gulf of tonkin conspiracy

Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. Given the maritime nature of the commando raids, which were launched from Da Nang, the bulk of the intelligence collecting fell to the Navy. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. He also requested air support. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. When Did the U.S. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Fluoride. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Not all wars are made for navies, and the U.S. Navy had to insinuate itself into the Vietnam one and carve out a role. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. 9/11. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. 313-314. . Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. The stage was set. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Congress supported the resolution with WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. To subscribe to Vietnam Magazine, click here! Ten shocking conspiracy theories that were completely Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. 13. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. McNamara was ready to respond. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. He is the author of. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. . Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo The NSA report is revealing. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. He spoke out against banning girls education. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. That very night, the idea was put to the test. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. "4 One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. Efforts to communicate with the torpedo boats failed, probably because of language and communications equipment incompatibility. 4. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. In truth, two of the torpedo boats were damaged, of which one could not make it back to port, while a single American aircraft sustained some wing damage. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. Suffice to say here that the version as presented here by Marolda and Fitzgerald is highly credible and completely plausible, and I for one am persuaded of its correctness.

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